We provide a new and concise characterization of the Banzhaf value on the (linear) space of all TU-games on a fixed player set by means of two transparent axioms. The first one is the wellknown Dummy player axiom. The second axiom, called Strong transfer invariance, indicates that a player's payoff is invariant to a transfer of worth between two coalitions he or she belongs to. To prove this result we derive direct-sum decompositions of the space of all TU-games. We show that, for each player, the space of all TU-games is the direct sum of the subspace of TU-games where this player is dummy and the subspace spanned by the TU-games used to construct the transfers of worth. This decomposition method has several advantages listed as concluding remarks.
Introduction
The Banzhaf value, initially introduced in the context of voting games by Banzhaf (1965) , and later on extended to arbitrary games by, e.g., Owen (1975) and Dubey and Shapley (1979) , is one of the most popular values in cooperative games with transferable utilities (henceforth, TU-games). The Banzhaf value assigns to each player the average of the marginal contribution to any coalition he or she belongs to, and considers that each player is equally likely to enter to any coalition. It has received numerous characterizations both on restricted domains and the full domain as well as on a fixed player set and on variable player sets (e.g, Dubey, Shapley, 1979 , Lehrer 1988 , Haller 1994 , Malawski 2002 , Casajus 2012 . It has also been extended to TU-games equipped with a coalition structure (Owen, 1981) or a coalition configuration (Albizuri, Aurrekoetxea, 2006) , to TU-games on antimatroids (Algaba et al., 2004) , to TU-games on convex geometries (Bilbao et al., 1998) , etc. Beyond the application to the measurement of voting power, the Banzhaf value has also been successfully employed to model control relationships in corporate structures (see Crama and Leruth, 2013 , for a recent survey on this question).
In this note we provide a new and concise characterization of the Banzhaf value on the (linear) space of all TU-games on a fixed player set by means of two transparent axioms. The first one is the well-known Dummy player axiom. The second axiom, called Strong transfer invariance, indicates that a player's payoff is invariant to a transfer of worth between two coalitions of which he or she is a member. This means that if the worth of coalition varies of a certain amount and, at the same time, the worth of another coalition varies by the opposite amount, then for members of both coalitions the payoff allocation does not change.
Characterizations of the Banzhaf value which in addition to the Dummy player axiom invoke only one another axiom can be found in Casajus (2012 Casajus ( , 2014 . The added axiom relies on a different principle than the one included in the axiom of Strong transfer invariance. To be precise, these characterizations use either an amalgamation principle between two players when the player set is variable or a similar principle of collusion when the player set is fixed. Theorem 7 in Casajus (2012) establishes that the Banzhaf value on variable player sets is characterized by the Dummy player axiom and 2-efficiency. The axiom of 2-efficiency is an axiom of amalgamation due to Lehrer (1988) which requires that the payoff of a player after amalgamation with another player is the sum of the individual payoffs of the two players obtained before the operation of amalgamation. Theorem 4 in Casajus (2014) establishes that the Banzhaf value on a fixed player set is the unique value that satisfies the Dummy player axiom and Proxy neutrality or Association neutrality or Distrust neutrality, provided that the player set does not contain two players. Proxy neutrality and Association neutrality are borrowed from Haller (1994) and Distrust neutrality is invoked by Malawski (2002) . These axioms of collusion between two players are in the same spirit of 2-efficiency, but works on a fixed player set.
To prove our characterization, and contrary to the above-mentioned results by Casajus, we derive direct-sum decompositions of the space of all TU-games. We show that, for each player, the space of all TU-games is the direct sum of the subspace of TU-games where this player is dummy and the subspace spanned by the TU-games used to construct the transfers of worth. This decomposition method has several advantages that we list as a conclusion. This approach has been used in Béal et al. (2013) by means of additions and transfers of worth, and in Yokote (2014) by means of additions of worth. Axioms of invariance constructed from the considered additions and transfer are invoked to characterize the Shapley value (Shapley, 1953 ) and the equal division solution, but are not satisfied by the Banzhaf value.
The rest of this note is organized as follows. Section 2 contains the basic definitions and introduce the axiom of Strong transfer invariance. Section 3 contains the main results. Section 4 makes some concluding remarks on the method of decomposition of the space of TU-games.
Preliminaries
Throughout this note, the cardinality of a finite set S will be denoted by |S|, the collection of all subsets of S will be denoted by 2 S , weak set inclusion will be denoted by ⊆, and proper set inclusion will be denoted by ⊂. Also for notational convenience, we will write singleton {i} as i. Let V be a real linear space equipped with an inner product "·". Its additive identity element is denoted by 0 and its dimension by dim(V ). Given a linear subspace U of V , we denote by U ⊥ its orthogonal complement. If V is the direct sum of the subspaces V 1 and V 2 , i.e. V = V 1 + V 2 and
If X is a non-empty subset of V , then Sp(X) denotes the smallest subspace containing X.
Let N = {1, 2, . . . , n} be a fixed and finite set of n players. Subsets of N are called coalitions, while N is called the grand coalition. A cooperative game with transferable utility or simply a TUgame on N is a function v : 2 N −→ R such that v(∅) = 0. The set of TU-games v on N , denoted by V N , forms a linear space where dim(V N ) = 2 n − 1. For each coalition S ⊆ N , v(S) describes the worth of the coalition S when its members cooperate. The set H(v), called the support of v, is the set of coalitions S ⊆ N such that v(S) = 0. For any two TU-games v and w in V N and any α ∈ R, the TU-game αv + w ∈ V N is defined as follows: for each S ⊆ N , (αv + w)(S) = αv(S) + w(S). The inner product v · w is defined as S⊆N v(S)w(S).
For any non-empty coalition T ⊆ N , the Dirac TU-game δ T ∈ V N is defined as: δ T (T ) = 1, and δ T (S) = 0 for each other S ⊆ N . Clearly, the collection of all Dirac TU-games is a basis for V N . For any i ∈ N , the i-dictator TU-game u i ∈ V N is defined as u i (S) = 1 if S i, and u i (S) = 0 for each S i.
Player i ∈ N is a dummy player in v if:
Denote by D i the subspace of V N where player i ∈ N is dummy. Player is null in v if:
Denote by D 0 i the subspace of V N where player i ∈ N is null.
A value Φ on V N is a mapping Φ : V N −→ R n which uniquely determines, for each v ∈ V N and each i ∈ N , a payoff Φ i (v) ∈ R for participating to v ∈ V N . 
Because Bz i (v) only depends on the sum of the contributions to all i's coalitions, Bz i is also invariant to a transfer of worth between any two coalitions containing i. Let us elaborate on this property. Consider any TU-game v ∈ V N , any pair of distinct coalitions S + ⊆ N and S − ⊆ N and any real number α ∈ R. The TU-game v + α(δ S + − δ S − ) ∈ V N is obtained from v ∈ V N through the (S + , S − , α)-transfer. We also write that a (S + , S − , α)-transfer involves player i ∈ N if i ∈ S + ∩ S − . By definition, Bz i is not altered by a (S + , S − , α)-transfer involving i, which implies that Bz satisfies the following axiom.
Strong transfer invariance. A value Φ on V N satisfies Strong transfer invariance if, for each v ∈ V N and each (S + , S − , α)-transfer, it holds that: for each i ∈ S + ∩S − , Φ i (v) = Φ i (v +α(δ S + −δ S − )).
Strong transfer invariance can be interpreted as follows. Suppose that the size of the coalitions does not matter in the coalition formation process. Imagine further that each player owns a part of the worth of each coalitions he belongs to, which he can freely transfer from one of his coalitions to another. Then, the axiom simply requires that such a transfer of worth is neither beneficial nor detrimental for the player. In a sense, the axiom is weak since it is silent of the influence of the transfer on the other players.
Results
It turns out that the combination of Strong transfer invariance and the Dummy player axiom characterizes Bz on V N . To prove the statement of Proposition 1, we will use the following decomposition result of the space V N .
Proposition 2 For each
, where
Proof. We first prove that ∆ i = U ⊥ i , where
. First, consider any S i. We obviously have:
Second, it is also clear that:
We proceed by induction on the size of the support 
To determine the dimension of ∆ i , we use the fact that dim(U i ⊕ U ⊥ i ) = dim(V N ) = 2 n − 1, and that the elements of δ S : S i ∪ u i are obviously linearly independent. Therefore,
∀S i, v(S) = 0, and
On the other hand, v ∈ D i means that:
Combining (1) and (2), we get:
Therefore, the unique possibility is v = 0, as desired.
Proof. (of Proposition 1) Consider any value Φ satisfying Strong addition invariance and the Dummy player axiom on V N . Pick any v ∈ V N and any i ∈ N . By Proposition 2, there is exactly one r i ∈ ∆ i and exactly one w i ∈ D i such that:
Applying Strong addition invariance and the Dummy player axiom on Φ i , we obtain:
which proves that Φ i is uniquely determines on V N . As player i has been chosen arbitrarily in N , conclude that Φ is uniquely determined on V N . Because Bz satisfies also Strong addition invariance and the Dummy player axiom, we obtain Bz = Φ on V N , as desired.
Concluding remarks
The logic behind the result contained in Proposition 1 is very intuitive. Pick any v ∈ V N and any i ∈ N . For each coalition 2. If we want to characterize Bz by using the Null player axiom instead of the Dummy player axiom, the previous remark indicates that we need (at least one) another axiom. Consider the following version of the axiom of covariance:
Obviously, Bz satisfies this axiom since Bz is a linear function on V N and Bz i (u i ) = 1 for i, and Bz j (u i ) = 0 for each j ∈ N \ i. Next, noting that dim(
Using the above direct-sum decompositions of V N and proceeding as in the proof of Proposition 2, we conclude that Bz is the unique value on V N satisfying Strong transfer invariance, the Null player axiom and the version of covariance as expressed in (3). 3. It is known that Bz i : V N −→ R is linear and onto so that the dimension of its kernel is dim(V N ) − dim(R) = 2 n − 2. Consider any TU-game v ∈ ∆ i ⊕ D 0 i . Using the unique decomposition v = r i + w 0,i , where r i ∈ ∆ i and w 0,i ∈ D 0 i , we obtain: This value satisfies the Dummy player axiom but violates Strong addition invariance.
